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FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6861  
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE  
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE  
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE  
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE  
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE  
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0599  
RUEHKE/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0212  
RUEHBZ/AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE 0040  
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000132

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A A/S, AF/C  
NSC FOR GAVIN AND HUDSON  
STATE PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN  
LONDON FOR POL -- LORD  
PARIS FOR POL -- D'ELIA AND KANEDA  
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/09/2019  
TAGS: [ASEC](#) [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [KPKO](#) [UN](#) [AU](#) [SU](#) [CD](#)  
SUBJECT: CHAD/SUDAN BORDER VIOLENCE? INDICATORS NEGATIVE  
ON THE CHAD SIDE

REF: A. NIGRO-ASQUINO TELCON 04/17  
[1](#)B. KHARTOUM 0525

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Classified By: Ambassador Louis J. Nigro for reasons 1.4(b) and 1.4(d).

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SUMMARY  
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[1](#)1. (C) We do not see indications of impending Chad military offensive against Chad rebels based in Sudan at this time, notwithstanding claims made by interlocutors in conversations reported in REFTEL. In the interests of providing perspective to addressees, as well as of correcting factual errors made by interlocutors, we offer a number of comments on statements reported in REFTEL.

[1](#)2. (C) We are not predicting that things will not get violent along the border at some point: We are saying only that we have no indications here, as well as from the Chadian side of the Chad-Sudan border, of an impending Chad military preemptive or preventive attack, nor of impending rebel attacks in strength.

[1](#)3. (C) We have coordinated this message with Embassy Khartoum. END SUMMARY.

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OUR PERSPECTIVE  
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[1](#)4. The View From Here:

-- There is right now no/no indication here of any impending military offensive by the GOC. That does not mean that there will not be one, only that none of the signals we would expect have been detected. For instance, if the Chadians were to attack Chad rebels in Sudan preemptively, they would use air assets first: There is now no/no indication of preparations to use those assets offensively. There is no extraordinary activity at military and intelligence HQs here. There has been no general mobilization or redeployment of

Chad military units recently.

-- Our current analysis of the situation is generally shared by the GOC, the French, the MINURCAT military structure, and UNDSS.

-- We do not pretend to predict what the GOC will do if it perceives an imminent attack from Chad rebels in Sudan, and we would not rule out such a preemptive attack. The GOC has said publicly and privately that if Chad rebels attack the ANT will go in hot pursuit of them into Sudan if it can. We do not doubt this.

-- The Chad military is much stronger military vis-a-vis the Chad rebels than formerly. But a preemptive attack into Sudan would open it up to response from Sudanese armed forces, which is a very different matter entirely. The Chad military is not ready for this contingency.

-- We do not credit rebel claims that their fighters number 10,000. Credible low estimates put rebel strength around 3,000; less credible high estimates run to around 6,000. We estimate that the number of rebel vehicles, in some ways more important than numbers of fighters, at 400. That would mean 25 of any 10,000 fighters to each vehicle, tight even by Chadian standards.

-- We do not credit rebel claims of new-found unity among famously fractious rebel commanders. The best information we have demonstrates continued deep divisions among the rebel formations, each ethnically based and loyal (this is a relative term) to a tribal leader.

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DATA POINTS

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#### 15. What We Know:

-- There is no/no movement of Chadians into Cameroon aside from normal commercial traffic, as interlocutor alleged in REFTEL, para 3.

-- There is no/no way that 10,000 Chad rebels could be inside Chad without the GOC, MINURCAT, UNDSS, French military and we knowing about it. There might be some rebel presence in the Modeina "pocket" but that is not the area that the interlocutor identified. The Modeina "pocket" itself, where Chad rebels do often establish a small presence, could not physically hold thousands of troops and hundreds of vehicles.

-- Hajar al Marfein, the area the interlocutor identified as the area of massive Chad rebel presence, is not "just across the border from El Geneina in West Darfur," as the interlocutor described it. Hajar Al Marfein is an area in the triangle region of Sudan, Chad and CAR, GEOCORD 11 10' 00" N 022 57' 00" E. The town of Adre, which hosts the Chadian military main base in Eastern Chad, is just west of El Geneina.

#### 16. Tripoli minimize considered. NIGRO